Washington Real Estate Law Blog : Washington Real Estate Lawyer & Attorney : Dickson Steinacker Law Firm : WA HOA, Building & Zoning Updates

The landlord must provide all necessary manpower and materials to complete the eviction as expeditiously as possible including boxes, large plastic garbage bags, and rolls of plastic sheeting to cover furniture which need to be provided by landlord.

The landlord must store the property if the tenant has served the landlord a written request to store the property not later than three (3) days after service of the writ. The sheriff serves the tenant with the proper form when the eviction occurs.

If the landlord knows the tenant has a disability which prevents or impairs the tenant from requesting storage it is presume the tenant has requested storage unless a written objection from the tenant is made.

The landlord may store the property in “any reasonably secure place” (including the premises) and may sell and dispose of the as provided in RCW 59.18.312.

RCW 59.18.312 requires:

A landlord shall take possession of any property of the tenant found on the premises.

If the total value of the property is less than $100.00, the landlord may sell or dispose of the property except for personal papers, family pictures, and keepsakes after seven days notice to the tenant. The notice shall either be mailed to the tenant's last known address or personally delivered to the tenant. After seven days from the date the notice is mailed or delivered to the tenant, the landlord may sell or dispose of the property After 30 days from the notice, you can sell or dispose of the personal papers, family pictures, and keepsakes.

If the total value of the property exceeds $100.00, the landlord needs to notify the tenant thirty days before the sale date by mailing or personally delivering the notice to the tenant's last known address. The landlord may sell property, personal papers, family pictures, and keepsakes, and dispose of any property not sold

The landlord may apply any income derived from the sale of the tenant's property against moneys due the landlord for drayage and storage of the property. The amount of sale proceeds that the landlord may apply towards such costs may not exceed the actual or reasonable costs for drayage and storage of the property, whichever is less.

Any excess income derived from the sale of such property shall be held by the landlord for the benefit of the tenant for a period of one year from the date of the sale. If no claim is made or action commenced by the tenant for the recovery of the excess income prior to the expiration of that period of time, then the balance shall be treated as abandoned property and deposited by the landlord with the department of revenue pursuant to chapter 63.29 RCW

Property stored shall be returned to the tenant after the tenant has paid the actual or reasonable drayage and storage costs, whichever is less, or until it is sold or disposed of by the landlord

The landlord may remove the tenant’s property to the nearest public property if the tenant has not served the landlord with a written request to store the property within 3 days of service of the writ.

Vehicles left by the tenant must be removed as a private impound with towing and storage arrangements made by the landlord.

Animals are impounded by the Human Society and held pending later release to the tenant or adoption.

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One of my favorite websites I visit to keep a pulse on the Puget Sound residential real estate market is the Seattlebubbleblog. Its founder and editor is Seattle resident named Timothy Ellis who goes by the blog name “The Tim.” http://seattlebubble.com/blog/ 

The blog has daily posts which include some great graphs, charts and analysis of the Puget Sound real estate market.  What makes the posters on the Seattle Bubble Blog unique is their credibility.  They were one of a few vocal media sources in Washington State that consistently and loudly predicted the current real estate crash before it happened.  In addition to good posts and analysis by “The Tim,” the comment section provides a lively discussion about Puget Sound real estate issues.  *Be aware homeowner: many of the comments made are from bloggers who predict continued steep declines in the Puget Sound real estate - so the blog isn’t for the faint of heart. 

The effect of local and federal laws as they relate to the residential real estate market in the Puget Sound area are also frequently discussed by the blog posters and authors with links to news articles and additional resources.

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In Washington State, the attorney-client privilege is defined by RCW 5.60.060(2), which provides as follows: An attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. 

The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and uninhibited communications between attorney and client. Thus, although the statute speaks only to whether the attorney may be questioned about communications with a client, the statute has been interpreted to restrict questioning of the client as well.  In a nutshell, the privilege bars evidence of communications between attorney and client only when the communications were intended as confidential. 

The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege. That is to say that only the client may give consent for the attorney to divulge confidential communications. However, the client may waive the privilege in situations where they bring a third party into closed door conferences with the attorney, share the privileged communications with a third party, or confer with the attorney where the conversation may be heard in the open by the public. Other situations of waiver include the client commencing an action against the attorney, and in a criminal case, a plea of insanity or diminished capacity waives the attorney-client privilege.

A corollary to the attorney-client privilege is the ethical rule governing the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. The Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) govern the attorney-client relationship. Once such a relationship has been formed, a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, to prevent the client from committing a crime, to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services, to secure legal advice regarding compliance with the rules, to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the client and attorney, to comply with a court order, or to inform a tribunal about any client’s breach of fiduciary responsibility when the client is serving as a court-appointed fiduciary. RPC 1.16. 

Even where an attorney-client relationship has not yet been formed, but the prospective client discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming such a relationship, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, with limited exceptions found in RPC 1.9. RPC 1.18.

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 In a recent summary judgment motion, the main topic at issue was whether the famed Mike M. Johnson case applied (Mike M. Johnson v. County of Spokane, 150 Wn.2d 375, 78 P.3d 161 (2003)).  As many will recall, Mike M. Johnson ("MMJ") states that contract provisions are enforceable unless waived by the provision's benefit ting party.  This waiver can be implied through conduct or actions, however, if it is so implied, the conduct/action must be unequivocal for waiver to be valid.  MMJ dealt specifically with a contract provision regarding the procedure by which a contractor could receive compensation for changes in the contract (or "change orders").  

The contract owner in MMJ at almost every turn notified (often in writing) the contractor that if it wanted additional consideration for changes in the contract, it must satisfy the requirements for change orders and turn in specific documentation and information to the owner.  MMJ failed to do so.  The court held that even though the contract owner had actual knowledge of the changed circumstances, this wasn't enough.  It would have to do more to waive other than simply having actual notice of the changes.

So, the big question remains: if MMJ wasn't waiver, what does waiver look like?  I believe that MMJ and another case called American Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Olympia, 133 Wn.App. 649, 137 P.3d 865 (2006) give us a hint: 

In MMJ, the court analyzed an assertion by the plaintiff which said that because the county had actual knowledge of the changed circumstances, that it therefore couldn't deny compensation for mere failure to follow the details of the contract.  The court disagreed:

"MMJ argued to the Court of Appeals, and maintains before this court, that when an owner has actual notice of a contractor's protest or claim, that notice, in and of itself, excuses the contractor from complying with mandatory contractual protest and claim procedures.  MMJ contends that the decision of Bignold v. King County, 65 Wn.2d 817, 822, 399 P.2d 611 (1965) establishes the 'actual notice' exception . . . [c]ontrary to MMJ's contention, the Court of Appeals in Bignold did not hold that the owner's actual notice of the changed condition in and of itself excused the contractor from complying with the contractual notice provisions.  Rather it was the owner's knowledge of the changed conditions coupled with the subsequent direction to proceed with the extra work that evidenced its intent to waive enforcement of the written notice requirements under the contract."  Id. at 388-89

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