Podcast: Defining easement

In this podcast, Rob Dickson explains the basic definition of an easement.  

 

Overview: Joint property ownership in Washington State

Owning property together with someone else is often referred to as concurrent or joint ownership (the terms concurrent or joint essentially mean the same thing in the property ownership context).  There are two types of concurrent ownership that are recognized in Washington State: (1) tenancy in common, or (2) joint tenancy with right of survivorship (RCW 64.28).  Usually, people refer to the joint tenancy with right of survivorship simply as "joint tenancy."  

What's the difference? 

Tenancy in common is the the default method of concurrent property ownership.  It does not include rights of survivorship, meaning that each individual property owner may pass on his or her portion of the property ownership to heirs.  In a sense, it is more divisible, meaning that tenants in common may transfer their portion of ownership to other parties.  Unlike joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, a tenancy in common may be created if the parties have unity of possession or equal rights to possession of the property.  This is true even though owners of the property may own disproportionate stakes in the property.  

Joint tenancy with rights of survivorship can only be created under specific circumstances.  This form of concurrent ownership provides that transferring of the property right is more limited.  Unlike tenancy in common, co-owners of the property own the property "together" in the truest sense.  If one should pass away, that person's share of the property would transfer to the other individual or individuals, depending on the number of co-owners.  Thus, the survivorship aspect of joint tenancy means that the property ownership is a non-probate asset.  To create a joint tenancy, the property must follow the four "unities" requirement: (1) unity of time (property acquired at same moment of time), (2) unity of title, (3) unity of interest, and (4) unity of possession.  

For a more detailed breakdown of tenancy in common, check out this blog post.  Though the article is somewhat old, it provides a good overview and includes some important case citations.  

Photo credit: digitalart

 

Podcast: Foreclosure Fairness Act -- What is it, and how to take advantage of the mediation option

 In this podcast, Rob Dickson describes how the new Foreclosure Fairness Act has impacted foreclosures in Washington. (Photo Credit: jscreationzs)

 

Podcast: Washington State is a "non-recourse" loan state (kind of)

In this podcast, Rob Dickson discusses the difference between non-recourse and recourse loans and how they effect foreclosures in Washington State.

Beginning the Eviction (Unlawful Detainer) Process in Washington: Notice, Service of Process, and the Show Cause Hearing

Washington has a very streamlined legal process for landlords to evict a tenant called an unlawful detainer action (assuming, of course, that the landlord is justified in doing so).  RCW 59.12.030 defines unlawful detainer, and outlines many of the grounds for eviction.  Because the unlawful detainer action simplifies and expedites the eviction process for the landlord, Washington has very specific statutory rules that landlords (and their attorneys) must follow in order for the eviction to be effective.  Proper notice and proper service on the tenant are essential parts of an unlawful detainer action.

Notice

Before the landlord can begin the actual legal action against the tenant, notice must first be given to the tenant to vacate the premises for reasons stated in RCW 59.12.030.  To do so, the landlord must follow one of three options outlined in RCW 59.12.040 by either (1) leaving a copy of such notice with the tenant personally, or (2) leaving a copy with a person at the residence and also sending a copy via mail to the residence, or (3) posting a copy in a conspicuous place at the residence, leaving a copy with anyone at the residence, and sending a copy via mail to the residence.  As a practical matter, it would be wise to document each step in this process to prove compliance with this procedure, which is usually done by affidavit.

If the tenant does vacate the premises, the landlord can immediately take possession of the premises and, pursuant to RCW 59.18.310, can seek to recover from the tenant outstanding rent owed, if any.  If the tenant left behind personal property at the premises, look here for a discussion on what the landlord may or must do.

Commencing the Action (Summons and Complaint)

If the tenant does not vacate the premises, an unlawful detainer legal action is required to effectively evict the tenant.  To begin, just like in any other civil action, the landlord must file a summons and complaint (or, better yet, have an attorney do so).  If rent is owed, the complaint should provide the amount.  The summons must state, among other things, the timeframe within which the tenant must respond.  See RCW 59.12.080; RCW 59.18.365.  In other civil actions, the timeframe is typically 20 days, but because this action is more streamlined, RCW 59.12.070 allows a landlord to require response within as few as seven days (although no more than thirty days). 

To properly serve the defendant with the summon and complaint, the same process is required for service as in other civil actions, see RCW 59.18.365, which generally requires personal service, or if the court allows, by publication.

Show Cause Hearing

Along with the summons and complaint, the landlord can also obtain from the court, and serve on the tenant, an order requiring the tenant to appear in court at a show cause hearing.  See RCW 59.18.370.  Conveniently, the timeframe for the tenant to appear at this hearing can be exactly the same as the timeframe as required for the tenant to respond to the summons and complaint (i.e., within as few as seven days, but no more than thirty days).  What makes this hearing so useful for the landlord is that, at the hearing, the burden is on the tenant, rather than the landlord, to show cause (or prove) why the property should not be restored to the landlord.  This hearing is the most expeditious way for the landlord to retake possession of the premises because, if the tenant cannot do so, or if the tenant fails to appear altogether, then the court will typically order the sheriff to restore property to the landlord.  The court may also grant to the landlord other requests made in the complaint, such as payment of outstanding rent.

Podcast: Second mortgages and foreclosures

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IMF pushing for US banks to reduce principal amounts on home loans

According to a recent Washington Post article by Howard Schneider, the International Monetary Fund is pushing for lenders in the United States to agree to principal reductions on their existing loans.

As a general rule, banks are very (VERY) reluctant to reduce principal reductions.  It will be interesting to see if these types of pressures, from international organizations to be exact, will actually have an effect on the loan modification strategies that US lending institutions currently follow.  

Here's a quote from the article: 

 

"International Monetary Fund chief Christine Lagarde called on the U.S. government to reduce the mortgage debt owed by homeowners as a way help to revive the nation’s economy and stimulate growth in the wider industrialized world.

Speaking Thursday at the Brookings Institution, Lagarde urged that this relief be extended to loans held by mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The issue of whether to reduce mortgages held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, representing more than half of U.S. home loans, has become contentious in Washington in recent months.

Ahead of the IMF’s spring meetings next week, agency analysts have been warning that household debt — in particular, mortgages that are in default or that exceed the value of the borrower’s home — is dragging down growth in developed countries at a time when the global economy is struggling to revive."

Photo: renjith krishnan

 

 

 

 

Podcast: What is a Short Sale?

 

Photo credit: ddpavumba  

How to secure attorney's fees on a contractor's bond

Whenever you find yourself dealing with a contractor, you will also find yourself dealing with that contractor’s bond almost without exception.  Under Washington statute Title 18, general contractors and subcontractors alike are required to file evidence of a surety bond with the Department of Labor and Industries of Washington State.  RCW 18.27.040 (general contractor bond must be in the amount of $12,000 and a subcontractor or “specialty” contractor bond must be in the amount of $6,000).  The statute’s purpose is “to afford protection to the public including all persons, firms and corporations furnishing labor, materials, or equipment to a contractor from unreliable, fraudulent, financially irresponsible, or incompetent contractors.”  RCW 18.27.140.  It is a misdemeanor for a contractor to work without first being registered pursuant to the statute.  RCW 18.27.020(2)(a).

 The mandatory contractor’s bond requirement is important to potential litigants because any person who may file a claim against the contractor is also permitted to specifically name the surety bond as a party to the suit.  Of course, naming the bond involves particular pleading requirements in order to comply with the statute.  When done right this statute can secure you an increasingly rare award as part of the recovery: YOUR ATTORNEYS’ FEES!!  See RCW 18.27.040(6).  Such statutes are quite in the opposite of the general rule that each party in a civil action is responsible for paying its own attorneys’ fees and costs.  In re Impoundment of Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wn.2d 145, 160, 60 P.3d 53 (2002) (commonly referred to as the “American rule”).  In an effort to put some teeth in the statute, Washington legislators expressly included that attorneys’ fees were a possible award to bona fide litigants.

 However, the statute has been subject to some scrutiny in recent caselaw from several levels of the State’s judiciary in recent months.  The contractor’s registration statute was thoroughly examined in Cosmopolitan Engin. Group, Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 292, 149 P.3d 666 (2006).  In that case, one litigant claimed that the contractor’s bond statute allowed the prevailing party to recover its attorneys’ fees from both the contractor and the surety bond itself.  Id. at 298.  In undertaking its statutory interpretation of RCW 18.27.040, the Court deduced that the placement of the attorneys’ fee provision, when considering the statutory scheme in its entirety, refers “only to action for recovery against the contractor’s bond.  Id. at 299.  Hence, the Court limited recovery of attorneys’ fees under this section to the amount of the contractor’s bond due to its precise placement in the contractor’s bond statute.  In apparent dicta, the Court further rationalized its decision based on the legislatures’ failure to expressly identify that attorneys’ fees were available in suit “against the contractor or against the contractor’s bond” independently of one another.  Id. at 301.  The court’s reasoning makes sense due to the fact that a litigant could not sue a contractor’s bond under the statute without first initiating a claim against the contractor for breach of contract.  The Cosmopolitan decision and its authority for limiting an attorney fee award specifically to the amount of the bond was reaffirmed as recently as last December in an appellate decision from Division Three.  See Brotherton v. Kralman Steel Structures, Inc., 2011 WL 6822261, *5-9 (Div. 3 2011).  Thus, the prospect of pursuing fees from the contractor party seems to be quite settled without much room to argue the alternative.

 Cosmopolitan also explained that RCW 18.27.040 is a one-way statute.  Id. at 302, n.3.  What is meant by “one-way” is that a subcontractor can sue up the chain and recover against the upper tier contractor’s bond, but not vice versa. Id.  Such a dynamic allows suppliers to recover against bond rather than resorting to placing a lien on the consumer’s property for a dispute that does not necessarily involve the homeowner at all.  Id. (citing Int’l Comm. Collectors, Inc. v. Carver, 99 Wn.2d 302, 308, 661 P.2d 976 (1983); Stewart Carpet Serv., Inc. v. Contractors Bonding & Ins. Co., 105 Wn. 2d 353, 365-66, 715 P.2d 115 (1986)).

Photo Credit: scottchan

Taxes and loan modifications: what's the impact?

 How does a loan modification effect a person's taxable income? 

1.      The general rule is that when debt for which a person is liable is canceled or forgiven, the canceled amount must be included in a party’s reported income.

Generally, if a debt for which a person is personally liable is forgiven, the forgiven amount must be included in that person’s income.   The IRS defines debt to include any indebtedness for which one is personally liable, or subject to which one holds property.  If a person is not personally liable for a debt, the cancellation income will need to be included if a person retains the collateral and either: (1) the lender offers a discount for the early payment of the debt, or (2) the lender agrees to a loan modification that results in the reduction of the principal balance of the debt. 

 

2.      There is an exception to the general rule for debt incurred to finance the purchase, construction or substantial improvement of a person’s residence.

 A person can exclude canceled debt from income if it is qualified principal residence indebtedness.  Qualified principal residence indebtedness is any mortgage a person took out to buy, build or substantially improve his or her main home.  The mortgage must be secured by the main home.  A person’s main home is the home where he or she ordinarily lives most of the time.  A person may only have one main home at any one time.  The IRS has not provided guidance on what it considers a “main home,” but does say it will look at the facts and circumstances in every case.  A person is limited to excluding $2 million of qualified principal residence indebtedness.  If a person excludes canceled qualified principal residence indebtedness and continues to own the home after the cancellation, the person must reduce the basis of the home by the amount of the canceled indebtedness, but may only reduce the basis to zero.  The legal authority for this memo comes from IRS Publication 4681, except where other authorities are cited.

Photo: cooldesign